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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRIGHTON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-




HARRIS, BEACH, WILCOX, RUBIN and LEVEY 
(A. TERRY VAN HOUTEN, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Employer 
PAUL E. KLEIN, ESQ. (HAROLD G. BEYER, JR., 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Petitioner 
The Brighton Teachers Association, New York Educators 
Association /National Education Association (Association) 
petitioned to add tutors employed by the Brighton Central School 
District (District) to a unit of teachers that it already rep-
1 . 
resents. It argued that the two groups share.a community of 
interest.. The District opposed the petition on the ground that 
the teachers and tutors do not share a community of interest and, 
therefore, should not be in the same unit. 
The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representa-
tion (Director) determined that there was not a sufficient com-
munity of interest between the tutors and the teachers for them 
to be included in a single unit and he dismissed the petition. 
1_ The Association indicated that it wished to represent the 
tutors only if they were included in the same unit as the 
teachers. 
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He found that the benefits received by the tutors and the teachers 
are significantly different in that tutors work less than full 
tirae and are paid an hourly wage for the actual hours worked. 
Moreover, they receive no fringe benefits except that individual 
tutors may elect to be covered by the teachers' retirement system. 
The teachers, on the other hand, receive an annual salary and many 
fringe benefits. 
The Director concluded that the interests of both the tutors 
and teachers would be adversely affected if they were placed in 
a s i n g l e u n i t . Quoting h i s dec i s i on in Sbiriers USD, 12 PERB 1[4016 
(1979), in which he held that groups of employees with, diverse 
2 
terms of employment should not be in a single unit, he said 
that: 
"as one would likely seek to gain economic 
advantages already attained by the other, 
possibly at the expense of their continuation 
or enhancement. This potential for confilict is 
such as to make joinder unwise." 
The Association argues against the reasoning applied by the 
Director, It contends that tutors function as teaching assistants 
and share working conditions with teachers, both groups of employ-
ses being engaged in allied professional work. The Association 
lotes that in Whitesbbro, 11 PERB 1(4043 (1973), the Director 
placed teaching assistants and teachers in a single unit.. 
The Association now makes the same argument in support of 
;he exceptions as it made before the decision of the Director. 
£ The Somers decision was appealed to this Board and was affirmed. 
12 PERB 113068 (1979). As the exceptions did not deal with the 
issue before us here, we did not comment on this aspect of the 
Director's decision,. 
r esn 
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Having reviewed the record, we affirm the material findings 
3 
of fact of the Director. In Whitesboro, the teaching assistants 
and teachers had nearly identical working conditions and benefits 
and had many similar duties. Here, although there is some simi-
larity between the occupational tasks of tutors and teachers, 
there is no similarity in the benefits of the two groups. 
For the reasons stated by the Director, we affirm his con-
clusion of law that groups of employees with diverse terms of 
employment should not be in a single unit. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
November 10, 1980 
^-/fc^Az/L 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
2zu~ A^<^<^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, er 
3_ We note the Association's objection to the Director's state-
ment that tutors are not evaluated pursuant to any formalized 
procedure and have considered the evidence in the record that 
there is a two-page guideline form for the evaluation of 
tutors. Whether the use of the guideline form constitutes a 
formalized evaluation procedure is irrelevant. It is clear 
that the manner of the evaluation of tutors is so significantly 
different from the manner of the evaluation of teachers as to 
constitute a distinct term and condition of employment. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., 
Respondent, 
-and-
THOMAS C. BARRY, 
"Charging TartyT 
//2B-11/11/80 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-4229 
BERNARD F. ASHE, ESQ., (IVOR 
MOSKOWITZ, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent 
THOMAS C. BARRY, p_ro se 
The charge herein was filed by Thomas C. Barry against 
United University Professions, Inc. (UUP) alleging that UUP 
violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act by refusing to supply him with any 
financial information in support of its refund to him of so much 
of the agency fee paid by Barry as UUP uses "in aid of activities 
or causes of a political or ideological nature only incidentally 
related to terms and conditions of employment" fCSL §208.3(a)]. 
After the hearing, the hearing officer found that UUP had failed 
to provide such information and that such failure violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Act (13 PERB '[4541). As a remedy, he directed 
UUP to furnish all individuals who applied for and received 
refunds for the fiscal years 1977-78 and 1978-79 detailed 
explanations and information related to their refunds; and to 
furnish such information in connection with all future refunds at 
the time of such refunds. 
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The matter comes before us on the exceptions filed by UUP. 
' FACTS 
UUP i s the exc lu s ive n e g o t i a t i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the 
P r o f e s s i o n a l Serv ices Unit of t h e S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y of New York. 
Pursuant to §208.3(a) of the Act , UUP r e c e i v e s agency fee 
deduct ions from the s a l a r i e s of u n i t employees who a r e not UUP 
meirihersT~'^Srecrry~irs~suchr"an~a~g~e7ncy~feen?ayer~ UUP^ha^^esTahlishea, 
as r e q u i r e d by §208 .3 (a ) , a procedure under which agency fee 
payers may apply for a refund. Barry app l i ed for and r e c e i v e d a 
refund for the 1977-78 f i s c a l y e a r . 
The UUP refund procedure provides that if the employees 
seeking refunds are not satisfied with the amount received they 
may then appeal through a three-step process: first, to the. UUP 
Executive Board; next to its governing body, the Delegate 
Assembly; and finally to a neutral appointed and paid for by UUP. 
Barry applied for a refund for the 1977-78 fiscal year in 
September 1978, and in March 1979 received a check for seventy-
six cents (76(£). Shortly thereafter, he filed an appeal which 
was turned down by the Executive Board in June 1979. He then 
appealed to the Delegate Assembly which rejected his appeal in 
October 1979. He took his appeal to the next step, a hearing 
before the neutral, in January, 1980. It appears that the neu-
tral's determination was rendered on or about June 6, 1980. 
Barry testified that when he first requested the refund, and 
thereafter at the first two stages of the appeals process, he asked 
GO«O 
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UUP to supply him with an "itemized, audited and notarized 
statement of the complete receipts and expenditures" not only of 
UUP but also of its state and national affiliates. UUP supplied 
none of the requested figures prior to the hearing before the 
neutral. 
- _ ^ _ — _ - _ - . 
In its exceptions to the hearing officer's determination, UUP 
argues that: 
1. PERB lacks jurisdiction to consider the adequacy of 
its appeal procedures; 
2. UUP has met the requirements imposed by this Board 
in earlier cases; 
3'.. Barry had not exhausted his internal union remedies 
when he filed the charge; 
4. Pertinent information was available to all unit 
employees during the first two steps pf the appeals' procedure, but 
that in any event,UUP is not required to provide the information 
requested until the last step of the procedure; 
5. The hearing officer's remedial order transcends 
PERB's authority; and 
6. By not availing himself of oppprtunities for 
disclosure during the hearing before the neutral, Barry has 
waived his rights to obtain the information he seeks. 
Barry has filed a response in support of the hearing officer's 
determination, but urges only that -the ^  remedy- is '-inadequate. 
0 0 *•' / 
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• DISCUSSION 
On the basis of the record herein, there can be no dispute 
that Barry requested itemized financial information in support of 
the refund which UUP gave him and that such information was not 
made available at the time of the refund nor during the first two 
appellate steps of UUP's procedures. In effect, Barry was re-
q-uired—to—appeal—to—the—Executive Boar-d, to—the-Deleg-ate-As-S-embly 
and, finally, to the neutral without having any idea on what basie 
UUP determined the amount of the refund. We agree with the con-
clusion of the hearing officer, and so determine, that the re-
fusal of the UUP to provide the requested information at the 
times in question constituted a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the 
Act. 
We may briefly dispose of several of UUP's exceptions. (1) 
We have previously considered UUP's argument addressed to our 
1 
jurisdiction (UUP and Eson, 11 PERB 13068). That jurisdiction 
exists here because a refund procedure which does not adequately 
protect the rights of nonmembers violates §209-a.2(a) of the Act 
by interfering with their right to refrain from participating in 
an employee organization (CSL §202). UUP is under a continuing 
responsibility to ensure that its procedure is fairly maintained 
and implemented. The charge herein raises a question related to 
such implementation. (2) UUP's exhaustion of remedies argument 
is without merit. Barry complains that the appeals process it-
self is violative of his rights under the Act, since UUP's re-
fusal to furnish relevant information has made its procedure co-
1 See also UUP v. Newman, AD2d ; :lv. to app. den.,' ' 
NY2d (October 14, 1980). 
6578 
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ercive and unworkable. As Barry reasonably seeks by this charge 
to have this information in advance of invoking the appeals pro-
cess, the neutral cannot grant that relief. There is no reason, 
therefore, to compel Barry to exhaust the appeals process prior 
to filing his charge. (3) Finally, we cannot consider the 
hearing before the neutral -- whatever right of discovery may 
there have been afforded Barry -- to be corrective of the coer-
cive impact under the Act of UUP's prior conduct. As an important ': 
incident of his right to refrain from participating in the UUP, 
Barry had the right to have the requested information before pro-
ceeding to appeal in order to make a reasonable judgment as to 
whether an appeal from UUP's refund was warranted and likely to 
succeed. UUP's refusal to give such information at that time 
denied him that right and the charge based upon that denial is 
not rendered moot by subsequent events that might occur at the 
ultimate stage of the UUP appeal.procedure. 
In view of UUP's first and second exceptions, in particular, 
reference to background events is, we believe, necessary to indi-
cate that UUP's refund procedure, together with the three-step 
appellate procedure, was devised by UUP and not by this Board. 
Questions as to the adequacy of that procedure and its appellate 
process have been presented to this Board through the filing of 
improper practice charges. In UUP and Esbn, 11 PERB 1f3068, we 
determined that UUP's published refund procedure did not comply 
with the statutory requirement that a reasonable refund procedure 
be "established and maintained" to preserve the carefully pre-
scribed rights of nonmembers'. We required certain specific 
changes to be made in the procedure. Subsequently, we determined 
that a revised refund procedure complied with the statute, pro-
Board - U-4229 -6 
vided it was understood that the appellate process would be 
accomplished in an expeditious manner '('UUP arid Eson, 11 PERB 
1f3074) . These decisions were rendered on the facial provisions 
of the procedure without any evidence -- since none was available 
at that time -- as to the manner in which UUP would implement its 
procedures in practice. 
-The-rea-f-te-r-,---we—d-i-rected—an—tnvestig-a-t-ion—to—determine- whether 
UUP was implementing its procedures in compliance with our pre-
vious orders. We concluded that UUP was not in compliance with 
our orders since it was not implementing its procedures in an 
expeditious manner. We directed UUP to complete all appellate 
steps within specified time limits (UUP and Eson, 12 PERB 5(3093) . 
That determination has been confirmed by the Appellate Division, 
United University Professions, Inc. v. Newman, AD2d , 1-v. to 
app. den., NY2d (October 14, 1980). 
Now, on the basis of Barry's improper practice charge, we are 
apprised of further details of the manner in which UUP has 
"maintained" and implemented its refund procedures. The record 
in this case demonstrates that, notwithstanding the union's 
burden of proving the propriety of the refund (see Brotherhood of 
Railway and Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 US 113 [1963]), UUP 
refuses to furnish any financial information in justification of 
its refund to the objectors prior to the final-step hearing 
before the neutral. In accepting the three-step appellate pro-
cess as reasonable, we anticipated that each step would provide 
the objectors with successive opportunities to obtain relevant 
information so that UUP's initial determination of the amount of 
the refund might be intelligently reviewed by them. It is now 
<"» f— C\ s\ 
bOou 
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clear that the two intermediate steps can serve no such purpose 
and that the appeals are not treated bj UUP as a true review pro-
cess. Without the requested financial information, it is not 
possible for an objector either to make an informed decision 
2 
whether to appeal or to effectively utilize the appeals process. 
We reject as inadequate for the purposes of the effective imple-
"me^ "atxon~~o_f nzheTTefund procedure UUP' s assertion that its yearly 
budget and external audit are given to all Chapter delegates and 
are available on campus. Nonmembers should not be required to 
seek out the information in such an uncertain way in order to 
pursue their right of appeal. 
As implemented by UUP, no legitimate purpose appears to be 
served by the intermediate appeal steps. They yield no useful 
information and they delay unnecessarily, and frustrate, anyone 
seeking a genuine review. Until UUP offers a detailed justifi-
cation of its refund at the time of making such refund, the 
requirement that the objectors file successive appeals should be 
suspended.„ 
REMEDY 
The hearing officer has concluded that the remedy for the 
violation found is to require UUP to furnish the requested 
detailed information at the time of refund. Such a requirement 
is warranted so that employees may understand the basis on which 
their refund has been calculated and thus be able to determine 
whether an appeal is warranted and likely to succeed. However, 
2 At least 1021 objectors sought refunds. Approximately 85 of 
these appealed to the Executive Board. Forty-seven appealed 
to the Delegate Assembly. Twenty sought a hearing before the 
neutral. 
OOOiL 
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the hearing officer's direction to provide the required informa-
tion in connection with the 1977-78 and 1978-79 refunds is not 
adopted by this Board. No relevant purpose would be served by 
such information since the effect of the past violation found 
herein cannot now be corrected unless we were to direct a reopen-
ing of the time period to appeal those refunds . While we are 
concerned with eradicating the effects of the improper practices 
found, we recognize that the public interest would not be served 
by delaying recourse to the final UUP appeals step and to any 
further avenues of relief that may be available to the employees 
for the protection of their rights under this statute. 
We conclude, however, that UUP's refusal, as a general prac-
tice, to provide such information until the procedures are ex-
hausted and the objection is submitted to the neutral represents 
a more fundamental defect in the appellate procedures. Such 
refusal discourages employees from appealing the propriety of 
the amount of the refund received. The effect is to coerce them 
into allowing UUP to keep funds to which it may have no right 
under the statute, which would be tantamount to use by UUP of 
the agency fee for all purposes. Thus, as long as the procedures 
are implemented as they are, they serve only as an obstacle to 
the exercise by the agency fee payers of their §209-a.2(a) right 
to refrain from assisting the UUP in activities of a "political 
or ideological" nature. 
Accordingly, the coercive impact of UUP's inadequate imple-
mentation of its procedures requires that we now direct that UUP 
refrain from requiring that employees follow the first two steps 
of the appellate process of its refund procedures and that these 
00&2 
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steps remain inoperative until such time as this Board has 
determined that UUP has complied with our order directing it to 
furnish the requested information at the time of refund„ We shall 
retain jurisdiction of this proceeding for the purpose of assuring 
compliance with this order and for such other purposes as may-
appear to us to be necessary to effectuate the policies of the 
"ActT ~"~ ^ " ^ 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE DETERMINE that United University 
Professions, Inc0, has violated §209-ao2(a) 
of the Act, and 
WE ORDER that United University Professions, 
Inc. be, and it hereby is, directed: 
lo At the time of making any future refunds, to 
furnish to all individuals who apply for and 
receive refunds an itemized, audited statement 
of the complete receipts and expenditures of 
both UUP and any of its affiliates which 
receive, either directly or indirectly, any 
portion of its revenues from agency fees or 
dues, together with the basis of UUP's 
determination of the amount of the refund, 
including identification of those items of 
expense determined by UUP and its affiliates to 
be refundable. 
2o Until this Board has determined that UUP has 
complied with paragraph numbered "1" of this 
Board - U-4229 .-10 
order, to cease requiring employees to follow 
the first two steps of the appellate process 
of its refund procedures„ 
30 To post immediately upon all bulletin boards 
regularly used by UUP to communicate with unit 
employees a copy of the notice attached 
_her_e_t_OL_.and..-made_a—p-ar-t_of_thLs—or-der-o — — 
Dated: Albany, New York 
November 11, 1980 
-7t£z*e/?/y£c teHhttU&^dL. 
Harold R0 Newman, Chairman 
- / < # 
I d a K l a u s , Member -4 JLcu<X. 
David C„ R a n d i e s , 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
-. - and in order to effectuate the policies of the ^ • - - • _ _ _ 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
WE HEREBY NOTIFY ALL EMPLOYEES THAT: 
1. United University Professions, Inc. will,' at the time of 
making any future refunds of any portion of agency fee 
payments, furnish to all individuals who apply for and 
receive refunds an itemized, audited statement of the 
complete receipts and expenditures of both United • 
University Professions, Inc. and any of its affiliates 
receiving either directly or indirectly, any portion of 
its revenues from agency fees or dues, together with the 
basis of United University Professions, Inc.'s determin-
ation of the amount of the refund, including identification 
of those items of expense determined by United University 
Professions, Inc. and its • affiliates to be refundable.-
2. Until the Public Employment Relations Board has determined 
that United University Professions, Inc. has complied.with 
paragraph numbered "1" herein, United University Professions, 
Inc., will not require employees to follow the. first two 
appellate steps of its agency fee refund procedure. ' 




This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
VD'J'J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND and ROCKLAND 
COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondents, 
#2C-11/11/J 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
"arrd"=" 
ROCKLAND COMMUNITY COLLEGE FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1871, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
CASE NO. U-4123 
MARC L. PARRIS, ESQ. (Jack M. Blechery Esq., 
of Counsel) for Respondents 
WILLIAM J. BEENHOUWER, for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the Rockland Community 
College Federation of Teachers, Local 1871, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Local 1871) . It alleges that the County of Rockland and 
Rockland County Community College (County) violated §209-a.1(a), 
(b) and (c) of the Taylor Law in that the College removed 
teachers from summer school classes because they refused to 
waive their right to file grievances over the rate of pay that 
they were to receive for summer school work.' 
Before filing the charge, Local 1871 had also filed a 
grievance which was awaiting the award of an arbitration panel 
when the improper practice charge came before the hearing 
officer. The hearing officer issued an interim decision, 
13 PERB 14507 (1980), adjourning the hearing pending the 
_-ooo 
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^issuance of the arbitration award. He stated: 
!! 
"The charging party, upon receipt of the arbitration 
award, is directed to advise this hearing officer 
as to whether it still desires to proceed with the 
improper practice charge, and if it does, •to submit 
the award in order that it may be reviewed under 
the criteria-, set forth in' New York' City Transit 
Authority." — 
There were no exceptions to the interim decision of the hearing 
officer. Accordingly, we have not been asked to consider whether 
the hearing officer shxnild have dealt with the merits of the 
charge. 
2 
The arbitration award was issued on .February 5, 1980. After 
the issuance of the arbitration award, the charging party advised 
the hearing officer that it did not object to the arbitration 
award insofar as it dealt with the allegations of its charge 
related to §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Taylor Law. It acknowledged 
that the arbitration hearing was fairly conducted and that the 
award is not in conflict with the purposes of the Taylor Law. It 
asserted, however, that one of the issues presented by the 
improper practice charge was not litigated in the arbitration 
proceeding. 
The hearing officer determined that the parties did not, in 
In the Matter of New York City. Transit Authority, 4 PERB 
13031 (1971), we approved the deferral of the consideration 
of an improper practice charge to arbitration on these 
grounds: the issues raised by the improper practice charge 
were fully litigated in the arbitration proceeding; the 
arbitration proceeding was not tainted with unfairness or 
serious procedural irregularities; and the determination of 
the arbitrator was not clearly repugnant to the purposes 
and policies of the Taylor Law. 
A tripartite arbitration panel found that the County violated 
its contractual agreement with Local 1871 and it awarded 
the teachers who were removed from their summer school 
positions back pay. 
s-y ••• / 




the arbitration proceeding, litigate the question whether the 
conduct of the County constituted a violation of §209-a.l(b) of 
3 
the Taylor Law. He, therefore, considered the specification of 
the charge that the County violated this provision, and he 
determined that it was without merit. 
As set forth in the charge, the basis for this particular 
all.egation_J_S:-:_ •_ : _• -_„ .___ 
"On June 29, 1979, RCCFT President, Judith McFatter, 
met with College President, Seymour Eskow, Eskow 
demanded that, not only the individual Science 
faculty members, but also the Union, must sign 
such a release. McFatter refused to do so on 
behalf, of the Union and indicated to Eskow that 
each faculty member had the right by contract and 
law to grieve. Eskow remained adamant in his 
demands." 
Local 1871 asserts that the conduct of the County constituted 
improper interference with its affairs and that it was designed 
to prevent it from properly representing the employees in its 
bargaining unit. 
Relying upon our decision in Board of Education/Albany 
6 PERB 1(3012 (1973) , the hearing officer concluded that Local 
1871 misreads §209-a.l(b) of the Law. As stated in the Albany 
decision, §209-a.l(b) parallels §8(a)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act and prohibits employer domination of an employee 
organization or the granting of unlawful assistance or support 
to an employee organization. The reference in §209-a.1(b) to 
interference with the internal affairs of an employee organization 
3 CSL §209-a.1(b) declares that it is improper for a public 
employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation 
or administration of any employee organization for the 
purpose of depriving them of such rights." 
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is, like the reference to employer dominance and support, designed 
to prevent a public employer from meddling in the internal affairs 
of the organization or trying to control it. The conduct 
complained of here is not of that character. Rather it is an 
interference with the rights of unit employees to be represented 
Dy their employee organization in the processing of grievances. 
Ihis is a violation, of. §209--a. 1 (.a) of the Taylor Law, and it was 
dealt with by the arbitrator. Thus, even if established by the 
evidence, the conduct alleged by Local 1871 would not constitute 
a violation of §209-a.l(h) of the Taylor Law. 
We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
November 11, 1980 
^fcfrg*^/!? JI/L4 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
%*~^ /x>JU^u*^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randlesx Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of : 
: #2/0-11/11/80 
CITY OF POUGHKEEPSIE, : 
Respondent, : BOARD DECISION 
-and- : AND ORDER 
: . 
CITY OF POUGHKEEPSIE UNIT OF THE : CASE NO. U-4458 
DUTCHESS COUNTY "LOCAL" OF VEEST, : 
Charging Party. : 
RICHARD I. CANTOR, ESQ., for Respondent 
RQEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS., (Richard L. 
Burstein, Esq., of Counsel), for Charging 
Party 
The charge herein was filed by the City of Poughkeepsie 
Unit of the Dutchess County Local of CSEA (CSEA) on January 1, 
1980. It alleges that the City of Poughkeepsie (City) improperly 
subcontracted its waste water treatment and parking facilities to 
private contractors. A hearing was held on March 31, 1930. 
At the end of CSEA's direct case, the City moved to dismiss the 
charge on the ground that the collective agreement between the 
parties contained a management rights clause which authorized the 
1 
City's conduct. The hearing officer indicated that she was 
I The management rights clause provides that, "The City retains 
the right... to determine whether and to what extent the work 
required in operating its business and supplying its service 
shall be performed by employees covered by this agreement...." 
Board - U-4458 -2 
inclined to grant the motion to dismiss,, but would reserve judg-
ment until she read the transcript. CSEA then asked for an oppor-
2 
tunity to present two additional witnesses. The hearing officer 
agreed to permit CSEA to do so and adjourned the hearing until 
May 1, 1980. 
Thereafter, CSEA sought and obtained two further adjournments 
No hearing was yet scheduled on September 3, 1980, and the hearing 
officer wrote to CSEA that she would recommend to the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) that he 
dismiss the charge if, by September 12, 1980, CSEA did not advise 
her of dates in October when both it and the City would be avail-
3 
able for a continuation of the hearing. When, by October 3, 1980, 
the hearing officer had not been advised by CSEA as to the dates 
in October when it and the City would be available for continua-
tion of the hearing, she issued her decision dismissing the charge 
for failure to prosecute. 
CSEA has filed exceptions to the decision of the hearing 
officer. In support of its exceptions, it asserts that, commen-
cing September 10, 1980, it placed several phone calls to the 
City's corporation counsel so as to ascertain when, in October, 
2 CSEA sought to call the City Manager and the Mayor of the City. 
It indicated that it had anticipated that the two witnesses 
would have been called by the City and that it would have had 
an opportunity to cross-examine them. As it now appeared that 
the City would not call them as witnesses, it wished to call 
them as its own witnesses. 
3. The letter states: 
"If you wish to schedule the second day of hearing, 
please advise me no later than September 12, 1980 of 
dates in October on which both you and Mr. Cantor will 
be available. If I do not hear from you by that date, I 
will recommend to the Director that the charge be deemed 
withdrawn and the case closed." 
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the City would be available' to continue the hearing. It further 
asserts that it was unsuccessful in reaching the City's corpora-
tion counsel. It also argues that it did not understand the hear-
ing officer's letter as indicating that the record would be 
closed without any further notice to it, if, by September 12, 
1980, it did not furnish the hearing officer with a list of the 
dates when it and the City would be available to continue the 
hearing. Because of the statement in the hearing officer's let-
ter that she would recommend to the Director that he deem the 
charge withdrawn, CSEA believed that there would be a further 
communication from the Director which would afford it an oppor-
tunity to explain to the Director that it was trying to ascertain 
dates when the City would be available to continue the hearing. 
We reverse the decision of the hearing officer because the 
hearing officer's letter could reasonably have misled CSEA into 
believing that it would have a further opportunity to explain why 
it had not responded to that letter. We also note that the letter 
imposed upon CSEA alone the burden of ascertaining when, in 
October, the City would be available for resumption of the hearing 
and it gave CSEA a short time to do so. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE REMAND the matter to the hearing 
officer to reopen the hearing and, 
upon its completion, to submit her 
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decision and proposed order on the 
merits of the dispute. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
November 11, 1980 
Harold_R; Newman _,__Ch.airman 
S^L*. /r*JU«^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randlesx Member 
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